Lawyer Matching Problem

  • Date:

    Nov 16th, 2022

  • Author:

    Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

  • Speaker:

    Danisz Okulicz

  • Time:

    16:00 - 17:00

  • Abstract: We study pairwise-stable matchings of lawyers to indigent litigants. In this setting a negative externality arises: assigning a better lawyer to a litigant harms the opposing litigant and their lawyers. We characterize conditions under which stable matchings exist, and show that they correspond to situations in which the cases are primarily differentiated by the advantage they give to one of the sides, but some cases attract more media attention than others. We show that in any stable matching strong lawyers face weak opponents. We show that pairwise-stable matchings are efficient, but may not belong to the core.

  • Place:

    Zoom (online)